

~~SENSITIVE~~

CIA/SAVA /WVIND 700307



WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS

Week Ending 7 March 1970


NSA Declassification/Release Instructions on File.

For the President Only


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SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS

1968-1970



weekly average
for each month

OCTOBER 1969 - MARCH 1970

weekly data as reported, Jan-Feb-Mar
weekly average per month, Oct-Dec



US BATTLE DEATHS

decreased to 90 from last week's 113, which had been the first total in fifteen weeks to top the 100 mark.





SOUTH VIETNAMESE BATTLE DEATHS

remained unchanged at 242 compared to last week's 243 and the previous week's 241. The official total will change as late reports are received and will be lower than figures released to the press by the GVN.





INFILTRATORS DETECTED IN PIPELINE

numbered two battalion size groups, one of which had previously been accepted as a "gap-fill". Acceptance of four more "gap-fills" raises the estimate for the week to almost 3,400. Some 46,500 to 47,500 have now entered the pipeline since 23 October.





ENEMY-INITIATED INCIDENTS

dropped to 616 from last week's 702.



ENEMY KILLED IN ACTION

increased slightly to 2,105 from last week's 2,009.



SOUTH VIETNAMESE EFFECTIVENESS

as measured by the percentage of enemy killed by RVN forces decreased to 47% from last week's 50%.

Statistics for the latest week shown are preliminary

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Enemy Activity

Enemy activity during the week was generally limited to attacks-by-fire against friendly positions, though in the lower delta province of Bac Lieu, a composite enemy force, apparently including troops from the 273rd "VC" Regiment (dispatched from III Corps last summer), overran a Popular Forces' outpost and inflicted significant casualties on friendly forces. Country wide, major enemy units remain holed up in base areas in a fashion that does not suggest imminent large-scale activity. In the upper delta, however, there is evidence of an urgent effort to move supplies into the vicinity of My Tho (capital of Dinh Tuong Province) and rallier reports claim that a "Spring-Summer Offensive" is scheduled to commence in Dinh Tuong on 9 March.

Enemy Infiltration

Inputs into the infiltration pipeline continue to average about one group a day. Two four-digit groups were detected in North Vietnam and four "gap-fills" were accepted during the week. These groups total 3,393 infiltrators and their acceptance raises the estimate of personnel entering the pipeline since 23 October 1969 to some 46,500 to 47,500. Overall, 61 groups have been detected in North Vietnam, 26 in Laos, and 13 are "gap-fills."

Despite the influenza epidemic still prevalent throughout the infiltration pipeline, personnel and material continue to move. Logistics activity, especially in south Laos, has been substantially greater this dry season than during the same period last year with the high level of supply activity expected to continue during March.

In South Vietnam, the Communists seem to be attempting to resupply their forces in the Delta by sea. U.S. pilots recently observed at least 25 heavily loaded sampans and junks moving from Cambodia along the western coast of IV Corps toward the U Minh Forest, where the 273rd Regiment is holed up. Three probable maritime infiltration attempts have been made in this area by North Vietnamese steel-hulled trawlers since September 1969.

South Vietnam Developments

Since June 1969, the Viet Cong have been engaged in an accelerated campaign to place agents in the GVN armed forces, with the short-range objective of disrupting Vietnamization and the longer term objective of building up a subversive organization for the post-hostilities period. (One VC technique involves "false ralliers" who almost certainly helped to inflate last year's Chieu Hoi figures). Communist documents imply that there have been thousands of such penetrations. These claims are probably exaggerated but the Communists are undoubtedly having some success; e.g., five Popular Force positions in the Delta have recently been overrun, apparently with the assistance of VC collaborators within these PF positions. Though declining Communist prospects and improved GVN security over the past year are probably making it more difficult for the Communists to place their agents, the penetration threat nevertheless remains serious.

Communist Developments

The Communists have recently become more forthcoming on the prisoner issue, apparently as a result of adverse publicity and persistent U.S. pressures on this subject at the Paris talks. Early last month, Hanoi increased the frequency with which packages could be sent to the prisoners. Ten new names have been identified in the 180 letters known to have been received by prisoners' families since Christmas.

Other Developments

In Laos, Hanoi seems to be considering adoption of a "fight-talk" strategy. With the Plain of Jars now largely recaptured (by a predominately North Vietnamese force), the Pathet Lao have proposed a five-point settlement plan ostensibly based on the "Lao Patriotic Front's" 12-point political platform first promulgated in 1968. The new proposal calls for "general elections" and an interim "provisional government," but the proposal's discussion is made contingent on two key preconditions: cessation of all U.S. bombing (throughout Laos) and a complete withdrawal of U.S. military support for the government of Souvanna Phouma.

[REDACTED] Souvanna is elated at this Pathet Lao approach from his half-brother, Prince Souphanouvong. Souvanna Phouma feels this overture is a direct product of President Nixon's 7 March statement on Laos. Souvanna also believes that President Nixon's firm position of support for the Royal Lao Government, even to the point of openly acknowledging the provision of U.S. air support to RLG forces, has put him and his government in a strong position from which to deal with NVN and the Pathet Lao.

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